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China as a Creditor of Countries in the Global South

Anti-Imperialist Solidarity or a Modern Debt Trap?

Focus Paper 2:
China as a Creditor of Countries in the Global South -
Anti-Imperialist Solidarity or a Modern Debt Trap?

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China as a Creditor of Countries in the Global South - Anti-Imperialist Solidarity or a Modern Debt Trap?

by Jürgen Kaiser and Malina Stutz

1. Introduction

The People's Republic of China is currently the most important bilateral lender for numerous countries in the Global South. This has made the country, which was still considered a poor developing country three decades ago, go from borrower to lender faster than any other country. A further strengthening of China's position as a creditor is foreseeable after the announcement of large infrastructure investments as part of the "New Silk Road".

The background to China's expanded lending is the large current account surplus that it has run for much of the period since the beginning of the millennium, as a result of being a leading location for the mass production of consumer goods for almost all markets worldwide. This hard currency income initially funded economic and social modernisation in China itself. With the rise in Chinese wages, however, the development model based on cheap labour changed. Cheaper and poorer competitors took away some of China's mass production market share. Consequently, China started to move towards the high technology sector. Its growth rates, which were previously often in double-digits, levelled off at around 7 percent after 2010. With the end of an almost unprecedented boom during the years 2000-2010, the profits from domestic investments also fell, and China began to look for lucrative investment opportunities for its current account surplus outside its own borders. This has made it the largest net capital exporter in the world.

This generous provision of credit from the enormous current account surpluses of the past two decades not only generates gratitude from those whom China has helped to overcome liquidity shortages or whom China has helped to facilitate otherwise unaffordable improvements to their national infrastructure: it also arouses suspicion among intellectuals in many recipient countries traumatised by colonial dependencies and the mistrust of traditional western donors, which have lost relative influence. While China itself - following the Maoist thinking of its pre-capitalist era - labels its lending as an act of anti-imperialist solidarity that is not linked to political conditions, western observers and critical voices in recipient countries are increasingly using the term *debt trap diplomacy*. Still, Beijing is not being accused of earning much in particular from its lending. The accusation is rather that lending is used as an instrument to pursue geostrategic interests, in particular because economically weak countries are targeted to be driven into over-indebtedness and dependency by Chinese lending.

For some western donors/creditors, this mistrust has gone as far as to make them rule out their own debt relief for poor, heavily indebted countries with the argument that "only the Chinese would benefit from it." [1] In addition, US senators are warning against the IMF helping countries which are currently in critical debt as a result of the Chinese "debt trap diplomacy" to overcome liquidity shortages.[2]

On the basis of the still inadequate but, over the last two years, significantly enhanced, publicly available data on China's lending to countries in North Africa and the Middle East, Asia and Oceania, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin

[1] This was how an official of the German Federal Ministry of Finance described the situation at an expert meeting organised by the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau [Reconstruction Loan Corporation] in February 2019.

[2] Letter from 16 U.S. Senators to Treasury Secretary Stephen Mnuchin dated 3 August 2018; commented in V. Asghar (2018): "US Senators 'concerned' over possible IMF loan to Pakistan", The Express Tribune, 12.08.2018. When the IMF bridge financing body maintained continuing debt services from Latin America to US banks in the 1980s, or when the IMF was involved in the bailout of Greece in 2012, contrary to the rules of its *Articles of Agreement*, the Senate did not raise similar concerns. In March 2020 Finance Minister Stephen Mnuchin repeated the threat of the senators. See: https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-china-debt/mnuchin-says-imf-world-bank-funds-wont-repay-debts-to-china-idUSW1N2AE00V.

America and the Caribbean, Europe and CIS, we can try to provide an answer as to whether and to what extent the allegation of "debt trap diplomacy" is justified. Ten common assumptions on which the accusation of "debt trap diplomacy" is based are critically examined in the following section.

The starting point of the present analysis is an overview of Chinese lending to individual countries (Appendix 2) and of Chinese debt cancellation (Appendix 3), which has been compiled according to the methodology described in Appendix 1 and from the sources listed there.

2. Ten common assumptions under the microscope

2.1. "Behind Chinese lending is a well-organised strategy that involves all relevant Chinese actors in a process which is controlled by the state leadership."

The allegation of Chinese "debt trap diplomacy" partly plays on the explicit idea of a Chinese "master plan", or at least implies a very high degree of political coordination of Chinese lending.

When analysing Chinese public lending institutions, however, it soon becomes clear that Chinese loans are not issued by a single, centrally organised financial institution; on the contrary, a whole series of lending institutions coexist, each having a certain autonomy in the choice of recipient countries and the determination of conditions, and therefore the business interests of the individual financial institutions are mixed with the goals specified by the political leadership.

The main players in bilateral Chinese lending to countries in the Global South are the public banks – the *China-Export-Import Bank* (ChExim) and the *Chinese Development Bank* (CDB). Other actors include Chinese ministries and embassies, particularly the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM); state-owned commercial banks, including the *Bank of China* (BoC), the *Industrial and Commercial Bank of China* (ICBC), the *Agricultural Bank of China* (ABC) and the *China Construction Bank* (CCB); the *Silk Road Fund*; and the Chinese export credit insurance corporation, *Sinosure*.

With such a great number of large and financially strong institutions, can we really speak of a subordination to geopolitical goals? Certainly not in the sense of fine-tuning individual projects through a central body, to which the institutions mentioned would be held accountable in detail. However, studies which have been carried out do come to the conclusion that the general direction of Chinese lending is subject to guidelines which come from the core of the Communist government.[3] While the lending institutions have considerable autonomy in concluding individual credit agreements, it must be acknowledged that the overarching goals of expanding Chinese lending and its framework conditions are set by the highest levels of the Chinese State Party, and can be summarised under relevant terms such as the "Go-Out" Strategy (1999) and the "Belt and Road Initiative" (2013). The close interlinking of politics, state banks, commercial banks, and Chinese companies is a defining feature of the further expanding Chinese lending.[4]

[3] Chin, G. and K. Gallagher (2019): "Coordinated Credit Spaces: The Globalization of Chinese Development Finance".

[4] Chin and Gallagher (2019).

2.2. "China is now the most important lender for countries in the Global South."

Currently, there is no reliable and comprehensive data on China's claims on individual countries published in Chinese official sources.[5] However, a number of recent research studies have released extensive data on China's lending worldwide. From the sources listed in Appendix 1, lending by Chinese public creditors amounting to approximately USD 475.77 billion to the 145 countries examined was identified during the entire period assessed (2000 to 2017 inclusive) (see Appendix 2).[6] The time perspective is also important in this context: while Chinese lending has been increasing steadily with slight annual fluctuations since 2000, 2009 can be identified as the year of the great quantum leap forward (see Figure 1). Since 2009, China's annual lending has also exceeded that of the United States, the largest bilateral donor to developing and emerging countries to date, and China has indeed become the most important public bilateral lender in these countries, worldwide.

Figure 1: The amount of Chinese loans to all the countries which were examined (in USD millions)



* Information is not available for all countries for the entire observation period (see Appendix 2).

However, it is not only the government that lends to sovereigns in the Global South. In relation to total cross-border lending to developing and emerging countries - through other bilateral public donors, private banks and bond buyers, and multilateral financial institutions - China indeed accounts for 4.58 percent of total lending over the period of 2000 to 2014. This is substantial, but amounts by no means to the domination of the global market.[7]

[5] This is not only the case with China, but also with numerous bilateral creditors.

[6] The year 2000 was chosen as the start date of the analysis, as Chinese lending only increased to a relevant extent at the beginning of the millennium. All figures relate to current US dollars, i.e. the amount of a loan is stated in US dollars at the value in the year in which the loan was granted. Further questions regarding the methodological approach are clarified in Appendix 1.

[7] As information on Chinese borrowing is only available until 2014 for some of the countries examined, Chinese lending is only compared to total public and private borrowing until 2014 for these countries. See Appendix 2.

2.3. "China's strategic goals and Chinese lending cover the whole world."

The group of recipient countries for Chinese lending is actually very large and includes countries from all continents. 104 of the 145 countries surveyed had concluded at least one credit agreement with Chinese creditors during the period assessed. From a regional perspective, the picture is almost symmetrical, with credit flows of roughly the same amount to the four regions of Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe and CIS, Latin America and Caribbean, and Asia and Oceania (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Distribution of Chinese loans across regions over the period 2000-2017 (in USD millions)



It should be noted, however, that the distribution of loans among the individual recipient countries varies greatly in the four regions. In all regions, there are one or a few "champions" who absorb the largest, or at least a substantial part of the lending from China. In Latin America, these are Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, and Argentina, which together absorb more than 80 percent of all Chinese lending. In Europe and CIS, Russia alone accounts for slightly more than half of the lending. In Africa, Angola, Ethiopia, and Kenya together received almost half of all Chinese loans. Only in Asia and Oceania is the concentration somewhat less pronounced, as the largest recipient by far, Pakistan, only received around a sixth of all Chinese loans to the region.

When considering Chinese lending to individual countries and regions in absolute figures, it must of course be noted that this says little about the actual importance of Chinese loans for the respective country and their influence on the debt situation of the recipient country. In order to be able to make statements in this regard, the proportion of loans taken out in China must be considered in relation to the recipient country's total external borrowing.

While Chinese lending is relatively evenly distributed across the regions in absolute terms (with the exception of the North Africa and Middle East region), the picture is significantly different when compared to the total amount of public and private borrowing abroad.

As Figure 3 shows, China only plays an extremely significant role as a foreign donor to an entire continent in the Sub-Saharan Africa region, where it accounts for more than a fifth of total borrowing.

Figure 3: Share of Chinese lending in total public and private external borrowing abroad by region (2000-2014)



If China's lending is compared to the total public and private external borrowing of individual recipient countries abroad at country level, it can be seen that the share of loans borrowed from China accounts for more than 20 percent in 33 countries (see Figure 4). Countries in the regions of Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia and Oceania are particularly well represented. These countries belong to the heart of the Chinese "Belt and Road Initiative". As part of this Chinese project, new markets for Chinese products as well as new providers of commodities for Chinese industries are being targeted. Some particularly heavily funded countries stand out due to their wealth of raw materials, such as Zambia, or for their strategic importance, such as Pakistan, Djibouti, or the South Pacific island states.

Like other large official bilateral donors - such as the United States, Japan or France - China lends on all continents, but above all to economically or politically interesting partners. Countries which do not receive lending from Beijing include not only those which recognise Taiwan, but also those that are simply not politically or economically interesting enough.

Figure 4: Share of Chinese loans from 2000-2017 in total public and private borrowing



* Data for this country is only available up to and including 2016 (see Appendix 2).

** Data for this country is only available up to and including 2014 (see Appendix 2).

The colours correspond to the colour coding of the regions in Figures 2 and 3.

The illogical data for Turkmenistan, the Republic of the Congo, Tonga and Venezuela can be attributed to either or both of two reasons: (1) the discrepancy between the "commitments" shown here and the actual payments; and (2) gaps in reporting of lending or borrowing to the World Bank.

2.4. "Chinese lending is driving states into over-indebtedness."

According to the calculations in Kaiser (2019), 12 of the 33 countries which received more than 20 percent of all of their foreign borrowing from Chinese creditors during the period examined are currently in a critical debt situation, namely the Republic of the Congo, Venezuela, Laos, Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Zambia, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, and Sri Lanka.[8] It can certainly be said that Chinese lending has contributed significantly to a problematic debt situation in these particular countries. Chinese payments make up more than 50 percent of total public and private external borrowing abroad in six of these twelve countries.

A comparison of the countries that are particularly indebted to China as a percentage of all developing and emerging countries, however, shows neither a positive nor a negative correlation of Chinese lending with the debt situation of the recipient countries, at least based on currently available data. The 12 critically indebted countries correspond to approximately 36 percent of all countries which have borrowed large amounts of credit from Chinese creditors. This does not differ significantly from the share of critically and very critically indebted countries in the total of the countries listed in Kaiser (2019) (33 percent)[9].

Borrowing from Chinese creditors therefore does not appear to pose a higher risk of over-indebtedness than the same amount of borrowing from other private, bilateral or multilateral official creditors. In this regard, our data rather confirms the "appeasing" statements in international literature.[10] Still, as currently the largest official bilateral lender, whose handling of a possible bankruptcy of its debtors has a decisive influence on the development opportunities of at least 12 countries, there is no question that China must be an addressee of the international debt relief movement.

First of all, it cannot be said that China specifically provides loans to countries from whose possible payment problems it might subsequently benefit, nor that it explicitly avoids such countries and limits its lending to secure investments.

The assessment made here is questioned in the recent study Horn, S.; C. Reinhart and C. Trebesch (2019): "China's Overseas Lending", Kiel Working Paper No. 2,132. The authors conclude that around 50 percent of total Chinese lending to developing and emerging countries does not appear in official multilateral debt statistics. This means that the debt situation, particularly that of countries which have borrowed heavily from Chinese creditors, is significantly underestimated in both World Bank statistics and the IMF's debt sustainability analyses. As Horn et al. is essentially based on unpublished data, their assessment cannot be verified here. However, it must be taken into account that the proportion of countries which have borrowed large amounts of credit from Chinese creditors and are currently in a critical debt situation may be significantly higher than previously assumed.

[8] See Kaiser, J.: "Indebted States Worldwide", in: erlassjahr.de and Misereor: Global Sovereign Debt Monitor 2019.

[9] This result is also supported by a more differentiated view of the debt situation in these countries. A view of the number of indicator thresholds exceeded in accordance with the methodology used in Kaiser (2019) shows that the average number of thresholds exceeded both for the totality of the countries listed as at least "slightly critical" and for the subgroup of those countries which have received loans from China which exceed the average is 3.6 (on a scale from 0 to 15).

[10] Groom, D. (2019): "Misdiagnosing the Chinese Infrastructure Push", The American Interest, 04.04.2019 and Gill, S. and K. Karakülah (2019): "Is China Helping Africa? Growth and Public Debt Effects of the Subcontinent's Biggest Investor", Duke Global Working Paper 3.

2.5. "China provides expensive loans, while other donors mainly grant concessional loans."

As Figure 5 shows, China awards fewer than 20 percent of its loans worldwide on concessional terms. Even in Sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest of the world's regions examined here, it can be assumed that less than half of Chinese lending is based on conditions which meet the OECD criteria for development aid.[11] For all bilateral lending from all official donors, the picture is almost reversed: around 90 percent of all lending from states to states in Sub-Saharan Africa show a grant element of at least 25 percent.[12]

The accusation that China earns significantly more from its lending than the average of all public bilateral lenders is therefore justified.

Figure 5: Concessionality of Chinese lending (2000-2014)



According to AidData's *Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset*, version 1.0.

[11] In the definition valid until 2017, this is essentially a grant element of at least 25 percent and an intention of promoting development.

[12] This picture, which is advantageous for Western donors, is, however, only a snapshot: until 2004, only around 60 percent of outstanding Western debts to developing and emerging countries was concessional at any time. Two developments have changed this picture: (1) the cancellation of non-concessional claims under the HIPC initiative and some large debt relief to non-HIPCs, which mainly related to trade debt, including Russia (ex-Soviet Union), Nigeria and Iraq . (2) The absence of major damage to publicly secured exports from industrialised countries. For example, the federal government currently reports trade receivables from all developing and emerging countries amounting to 4.5 billion euros - with a total outstanding risk of 55.5 billion euros. In the generally expected new wave of bankruptcies, these receivables can very quickly rise again if Western export insurers have to pay out to their private policyholders on a large scale.

2.6. "The projects financed by China are conditional on Chinese companies being involved in the implementation of the project: their effect on employment rates in the 'beneficiary' countries is therefore minimal."

A 2017 study examining the impact of Chinese development aid and lending found that it produces growth effects comparable to development aid from traditional donor countries and higher growth effects than World Bank lending and private Western financing.[13]

This study does not comment, however, on whether the growth triggered will also lead to comparable distributive and employment effects. It is expected that this is not the case due to China's high share of tied aid. Tied aid means that lending is linked to the purchase of services or goods from the donor country (see Figure 6). Chinese loans often do not reach the borrowing country at all, but are paid directly by the Chinese loan financier to the Chinese contractor. In this case, Horn et. al. (2019) speak of a "circular lending strategy". This has two disadvantages: firstly, it is likely to lead to higher implementation costs for the projects financed, as competition for project contracts is eliminated from the outset. Secondly, multiplier effects in the debtor economy as a result of increasing and more qualified employment do not occur - or they are at least severely restricted.

For traditional donors, there was a long journey from the beginning of official development aid to the mutually agreed waiver of tied aid, as was most recently decided in the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*[14]. If China wants to be perceived as a development aid donor, which is not necessarily the case at the moment (see 2.5), it still has a long way to go.

Figure 6: Model of supply-based Chinese infrastructure financing



Source: Ache, H. and M. Schüller (2008): "China's engagement in Africa: opportunities and risks for development", German Society for Technical Cooperation, Eschborn.

[13] Dreher, A.; A. Fuchs; B. Parks; A. Strange; M. Tierney (2017): "Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset", AidData Working Paper #46, www.aiddata.org/publications/aid-china-and-growth-evidence-from-a-new-global-development-finance-dataset.

[14] OECD (2005): "Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action", www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm.

2.7. "China mainly lends in order to secure privileged access to the raw material markets of the recipient countries."

It is the openly communicated goal of the "Belt and Road Initiative" to connect better the sales and raw materials markets of countries in the Global South to the Chinese market. The enormous focus on the expansion of infrastructure facilities is an expression of this. By their very nature, these investments serve to extract and export raw materials to China. In this respect, they resemble the classic geographical patterns of colonialism in the 19th century. Like in China's case today, the construction of the most efficient port facilities, as well as traffic routes to the hinterland, were the geographical trademark of the time.

In most cases, such projects also naturally result in a "collateral benefit" beyond Chinese interests. However, similar to the colonial infrastructures of Western powers, this is not the actual driving force for infrastructure financing. The high proportion of loans granted by China and secured by the export of raw materials can initially confirm these assumptions. For a differentiated assessment of Chinese collateralised lending, see 2.9.

2.8. "China lures countries into over-indebtedness through favourable conditions and the waiver of political conditions."

It is often argued that Chinese loans are particularly interesting for recipient countries due to their favourable terms and easy availability, and that China is therefore "luring" them into over-indebtedness. This clearly does not apply to the interest rates of the contracts concluded, because, as we have seen, they are significantly less advantageous than Western financing on average (see 2.5). In addition, it has been shown that Chinese lending is linked to conditions that are unfavourable for the recipient country in other areas (see paragraphs on tied aid 2.6 on and collateralisation 2.9).

What is "alluring" about loans from China is something else: the social and ecological standards associated with Chinese loans are significantly lower than those of traditional Western donors.[15] The same applies to the criteria of "good governance" and respect for human rights. This makes Chinese loans particularly attractive to governments and projects which explicitly fail to meet Western standards and which would have little or no chance of financing without China.[16]

2.9. "By securing its lending and structuring its credit agreements, China is gaining unjustified advantages over other creditors."

Fifty percent of Chinese lending to African and Latin American countries was secured either with the financed infrastructure or with the income from raw material exports generated by it.[17] This means that in the event of repayment difficulties, creditors can either claim the proceeds of the exported raw materials or they can claim the infrastructure itself. In the case of raw materials as collateral security, an acceptance contract is often concluded with a Chinese import company at the same time as the conclusion of the credit agreements, and the proceeds

[15] Moskovits, D.; J. Reid and A. Rosenthal (ed.) (2019): "China and the Amazon: Towards a Framework for Maximizing Benefits and Mitigation Risks of Infrastructure Development", p. 6, www.thedialogue.org/analysis/china-and-the-amazon-toward-a-framework-for-maximizing-benefits-and-mitigating-risks-of-infrastructure-development/.

[16] Moskovits et. al. (2019) are able to show that Chinese funding in the Amazon region has increasingly flowed into projects which are particularly risky from a social and ecological point of view, the funding of which has been checked in advance by other international financial institutions and excluded due to the high social and ecological risks. See Moskovits et. al. (2019), p. 6.

[17] Groom, D. and K. Gallaghar (2014): "Bartering Globalization: China's Commodity-backed Finance in Africa and Latin America".

from the export of raw materials are paid into a Chinese trust account. So far, however, studies have not come to the conclusion that the collateral security for China leads to a sudden "abnormal" rise in profits as a result of changes to the market situation, with the collateral security for China therefore allowing the creditor access to raw materials below the market price. In addition, China does not actually manage to enforce the effective collection of the claims using collateral security. Venezuela and Ukraine are examples of the fact that far less oil and wheat have been exported to China than the amounts agreed in connection with lending.[18]

In addition, as a creditor who is often involved in multiple individual loans in the recipient countries, China has provided *cross-default* clauses[19] in numerous credit agreements. In Argentina, for example, two projects financed by China were linked to each another by means of an integrated *cross-default* clause. When Argentina wanted to terminate one project (a dam) in response to massive resistance from the local population, China pointed out that if they did so, the credit agreement for the urgently needed expansion of the rail network would also be cancelled.[20]

Such unilateral contractual arrangements make any rescheduling difficult through traditional procedures such as those in the Paris Club, which rely on the fact that all claims of the creditors involved in the negotiations are in principle not subordinated to each other. Multilateral debt rescheduling therefore spreads the resulting costs more or less evenly among all creditors. This principle is of great importance for the acceptance of such a regulation by creditors who are expected to waive a proper and contractually agreed right. With the systematic collateralization of its infrastructure financing, China falls behind standards which Western countries have painstakingly overcome through OECD-DAC agreements in the interest of a more independent development of their partners. China's readiness to move away from this practice, and degree of willingness to accept this as necessary for multilateral agreements in the event of debt restructuring, will be a key indicator of whether and, if so, how far China is willing to cooperate internationally as a lender.

2.10. "Where Western countries accept the need to cancel debts, China relentlessly recovers its claims."

Contrary to the image cultivated by Western finance and development politicians, China has already rescheduled or completely cancelled debts owed by countries in the Global South, and has done so on 122 occasions towards a total of 59 countries since 2000. A total of approximately USD 45 billion has been rescheduled; of which USD 9.4 billion was debt cancellation[21] (see Appendix 3). In 26 cases, this was debt relief for poorer countries, provided in parallel with the Western multilateral debt relief initiative for *heavily indebted poor countries* (HIPC). In those cases, China appears to have largely followed the Western line of almost complete debt cancellation. In another three countries - Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, and Iraq - China followed the agreements that these countries had made with the Paris Club, of which China is not a member, despite intense attempts to recruit it to the Club.

[18] Vgl. Feng, A.; A. Kratz und L. Wright (2019): "New Data on the 'Debt Trap' Question", Rhodium Group, 29.04.2019; und Kaplan, S. und M. Penfold (2019): "China-Venezuela Economic Relations: Hedging Venezuelan Bets with Chinese Characteristics", Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

[19] *Cross-default* clauses state that if a lender has granted several loans to the same borrower and the debtor defaults on one of them, the creditor can also accelerate payment of the full amount of the other loans. In the event of payment difficulties, however, this does not mean that the creditor actually gets his money, but it improves the legal position of a potentially suing creditor towards competing creditors.

[20] Danke, A. (2017): "Der große Geldgeber: Chinas Rolle in Argentinien", Deutschlandfunk.

[21] Hurley, J.; S. Morris and G. Portelance (2018): "Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective", Center for Global Development, Policy Paper 121, Appendix C.

Comparing these amounts with the performance of Western and traditional creditors makes little sense, as Chinese relief relates to debts which have only recently been built up, while Western claims go back as far as the 1970s.

In particular, the debt relief granted by China since the enormous expansion of Chinese lending in 2009 does not appear to follow either an agreement with other creditors of the affected debtor countries with a view to any co-ordinated restoration of debt sustainability, nor can a specific focus on poorer and particularly critically indebted countries be discerned. In addition, to a great extent the write-offs only affect a very small proportion of a country's outstanding debts to China and are often accompanied by new lending on a large scale. The write-offs therefore rarely lead to a significant reduction in the debt levels of the recipient countries. This suggests that there is not a well thought-out debt relief strategy guiding China's actions, but rather, Chinese debt relief is guided by political developments and, occasionally, by day-to-day policies - such as the strengthening of ties to African countries at China-Africa summits. The developmental effect of Chinese debt relief therefore tends to be less than that of the concerted initiatives of Western creditors.

Depending on the political interest, two contradictory examples of China's handling of the bankruptcy of its borrowers are often cited: in 2011, China cancelled claims on Cuba of around USD 6 billion without any further concessions on Cuba's side, while repayment bottlenecks in 2017 in Sri Lanka led to the port of Hambantota, which was built with Chinese loans, being ceded to a Chinese state-owned company for 99 years in return for cancellations of approximately USD 1.1 billion. However, the overview of debt relief since 2000 shows that neither of these two cases is typical of the Chinese approach: the size of the write-offs in Cuba is unique. All other Chinese write-offs have been between USD 1 and just under USD 300 million. China's intransigent attitude towards Sri Lanka does not at least seem to be exemplary of China's actions and is viewed by China observers as a public relations disaster for the Chinese leadership,[22] which will certainly not be repeated[23]. In fact, there have been various media reports since then about similar approaches towards infrastructure financed by China or via other forms of collateralised loans,[24] but none of these has been verified to date.

China undoubtedly uses debt relief, and the decision as to whether or not to grant loans, as an instrument to consolidate bilateral relations and to pursue foreign and economic policy interests through its debt policy. But this is no different to the conduct of Western donors, for example, who have made the implementation of the HIPC debt relief initiative dependent on the fulfilment of the IMF's reform requirements which have been based on Western models. And in parallel to a certain arbitrariness regarding the provision of debt relief by China, there have also been HIPC rules designed or interpreted in such a way that certain countries were included and others were excluded.[25]

[22] This is especially due to its parallelism with the opening and leasing of the "contract ports" in the 19th century. Overcoming this humiliation brought on China by the colonial powers has been part of the state myth of the People's Republic since its foundation by Mao Tse-tung.

[23] Bräutigam (2019).

[24] See "Rumours" in Tajikistan 2011: Kratz et. al. (2019); on the takeover of the international airport in Lusaka, Zambia: Heng, K. und V. Var (2019): "Cambodia and the Issue of China's Debt Trap", International Policy Digest, 20.05.2019; on the threat to the port of Mombasa, Kenya: for example, D. (2019): "Kenya Faces Losing Key Port to China Over Railway Loan", The Epoch Times, 23.01.2019.

[25] Examples of the inclusion were the reform of the access criteria at HIPC-II with the aim of establishing a more balanced relationship between the Anglophone and the initially disadvantaged Francophone African countries, and the generous interpretation of the income limits, with the result that Bolivia and Honduras could also be included . At the same time, a modified interpretation of the regulations made it was possible to retroactively exclude Nigeria from the HIPC debt relief after the dictatorship ended.

3 . Conclusion

Programmatic concepts of the Chinese Communist Party, such as those of international solidarity, cannot explain the realities of Chinese lending to sovereign countries in the poorer parts of the world. Rather, with the quantitative increase in its lending, China's lending policies are increasingly approaching a Western capitalist normality. In some aspects, it even falls far short of hard-won Western standards for responsible lending. This affects the concessionality of Chinese financing, tied aid, the high level of collateralization and other conditions associated with lending and, last but not least, the willingness to participate in multilateral solutions in the event of a crisis.

While China's lending policies do not have much to do with solidarity, the accusation of "debt trap diplomacy" also seems untenable. At least on the basis of the data currently available, it can neither be determined that the recipients of Chinese lending are increasingly drawn into a critical debt situation, nor is the seizure of infrastructure facilities typical of the Chinese approach in the event of repayment difficulties. However, that does not preclude China from using both debt relief and the decision to grant credit as an instrument to strengthen bilateral relations and to pursue its own foreign and economic interests.

However, as currently the largest official bilateral lender, whose handling of its debtors' bankruptcy has a decisive influence on the development opportunities of at least 12 countries (see 2.4), there is no question that China needs to become a part of multilateral debt relief initiatives. China's membership in the traditional cartel of Western creditors, as demanded by Paris Club members, is not an option. Rather, the problem of coordinating efficient and fair debt relief in the event of a crisis between China and traditional creditors should be used as an opportunity to think about new negotiation formats such as debt conferences, round tables, and mediation, as the United Nations has been demanding for many years.[26]

[26] Last detailed in UNCTAD (2015): "Sovereign Debt Workouts: Going Forward - Roadmap and Guide", unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1226.

Appendix 1: Overview of sources and methodological approach

As there are currently no reliable and comprehensive data on China's claims on individual countries published in official sources, loan flow information from China to individual debtor countries was compared with the total inflows in order to assess the relative weight of China as a creditor.

The starting point of the analysis are 145 developing and emerging countries, the debt situations of which were examined in Kaiser (2019).[1] Since Chinese lending to countries in the Global South has only increased to a relevant extent from the beginning of the millennium and all available databases trace Chinese lending back to 2000 at the most, the year 2000 was chosen as the uniform starting date.[2] However, data series are not available for all countries until the end of 2017. Where there was a need to deviate from this standard, this was indicated in the overview table (Appendix 2) and the illustrations.

Only financial flows that clearly generated a debtor position were included, i.e. neither foreign direct investments nor grants were considered. We also ignored currency swaps that are becoming increasingly popular in the context of the "Belt and Road Initiative." In the future, however, they will require more attention than the currently available data reveal.[3] Lending by the Chinese-dominated multilateral development banks, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB), was not evaluated, since only China's bilateral lending was of interest. We have only considered effective *long-term debt disbursements*. Accordingly, lending that only had the status of a non-binding declaration of intent to date was consistently excluded from the analysis. In individual cases, however, since not all data records mentioned below allow Chinese lending to be clearly differentiated - based on whether the Chinese party has only made an official commitment to disburse a loan or whether this has already been effectively disbursed - we may have overestimated the scope the effective Chinese lending. This inaccuracy can never be completely ruled out, since datasets mentioned below rely on publicly available reports on Chinese lending, and these sometimes fail to provide all relevant information regarding a lending operation. Overall, however, it can be assumed that data presented here tend to underestimate overall Chinese lending.[4] Fundamentally, we considered both disbursements to the public and private sectors of a recipient country.[5] In principle, we included only disbursements that were financed by Chinese state creditors.[6]

[1] Kaiser, J. (2019): "Indebted States Worldwide", in: erlassjahr.de and Misereor: Debt Report 2019 examines a total of 154 countries that are neither members of the EU nor the OECD. Mexico alone was included in the study because of its special historical importance, despite its membership of the OECD. Countries for which no data were available at the time of the analysis of the debt situation, and of course China itself, were excluded from the present technical information.

[2]For some countries and regions, the first Chinese disbursements were made later on. For these countries, therefore, the proportion of Chinese disbursements relative to the total borrowing abroad is higher for the period starting with the first Chinese disbursements. As for a uniform investigation period, however, the year 2000 was chosen as the uniform start date.

[3] Horn, S .; C. Reinhart and C. Trebesch (2019): "China's Overseas Lending", Kiel Working Paper No. 2132, estimate that the *People's Bank of China* (PBOC) has agreed $500 billion lines of credit with other central banks. Only in the case of Argentina can the authors prove that the $10.5 billion credit line was actually drawn. There is also a $1.8 billion agreement with Mongolia that was last extended in 2017 as part of a multilateral bailout.

[4] Horn et. al. (2019) have also compiled Chinese lending from the data sets mentioned in this technical information and used this information to calculate the current receivables from China vis-à-vis individual recipient countries. In their conclusions, they note that total reported lending can explain approximately $400 billion in receivables, while current official statistics on the Chinese balance of payments show this figure to be at least $750 billion. It can thus be assumed that a large part of the Chinese disbursements is not captured in the data sets mentioned here nor in our analysis. See Horn et. al. (2019), p.10.

[5] For African countries, only comprehensive data on public sector loans were available. Where the private sector in these countries has also taken out sizable loans abroad during the investigation period, and it must therefore be assumed that the information on Chinese lending underestimates China's actual disbursements to said countries, this is specified in the Overview table in Appendix 2.

[6]For African countries, however, our data base exclusively considers the information provided by the *China-Africa Research Initiative of* the *John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies* (SAIS-CARI), which basically includes both public and private Chinese lending in its data set. Since SAIS-CARI only provides cumulative Chinese lending data for the individual countries, private lending for these countries could not be excluded from the evaluation. In individual cases, this can lead to the public share of Chinese lending being overestimated. However, it can be assumed that the proportion of private lending is extremely low. A breakdown by lender published by SAIS-CARI shows that "supplier credits" and "commercial bank loans" (which are usually assumed to be provided by the private and not by the public sector)

Furthermore, the analysis only considered disbursements that could be confirmed by the following research institutes and, thus, belong to the following datasets:

AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset, Version 1.0.
AidData – Research Lab at William and Mary
aiddata.org/data/chinese-global-official-finance-dataset
AidData covers Chinese financial flows worldwide from 2000 to 2014.[7]

Chinese Loans to African Governments 2000-2017
China - Africa Research Initiative of the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (Sais-Cari)
www.sais-cari.org/data-chinese-loans-to-africa
The dataset includes Chinese lending to governments and state-owned companies in African countries from 2000 to 2017 (inclusive).

China-Latin America Finance Database (CLAFD)
The Inter-American Dialogue and Global China Initiative of the Boston University`s Global Development Policy Center
www.thedialogue.org/map_list/
The dataset includes the official lending of the two largest Chinese donor institutions, the Chinese Development Bank (CDB) and the China Export-Import Bank (ChExim), to the public and private sectors of all Latin American countries from 2005 to 2018. In addition, we have used AidData's information for these countries for the period 2000-2004 and for disbursements from other official Chinese donor institutions.

China's Global Energy Finance (CGEF)
Boston University Global Development Policy Center.
http://www.bu.edu/cgef/#/intro
The dataset includes project funding from CDB and ChExim in the energy sector worldwide in the period 2000-2018. The information from this dataset was used in addition to the information from AidData, especially for countries in the Eurasian continent.

China's Public Diplomacy Toolkit. Quantifying Chinese public diplomacy in East Asia and the Pacific.
AidData – Research Lab at William and Mary
www.aiddata.org/data/chinas-public-diplomacy-in-east-asia-and-pacific
The dataset covers the period 2000-2016 for the East Asian and Pacific countries, but goes far beyond the debt-generating financial flows of interest here. For the East Asian countries and the states of the Pacific, this dataset was therefore only used in addition to the information from *AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset,* especially for years 2015 and 2016.

The merging of different datasets was conducted conservatively: ambiguity regarding possible double listing of datasets in various sources meant that funding was disregarded.

only make up around 20 percent. It must be assumed that the majority of these lending actors are state-owned companies or state-owned commercial banks, which means that the public share of Chinese lending is only likely to have been overestimated by a very small proportion (<20 percent). Overall, however, it must be assumed that Chinese lending will ultimately be underestimated rather than overestimated based on publicly available data (cf. Horn et. Al. (2019), p.10).

[7] On the one hand, disbursements captured here are clearly valued as *Official Development Assistance* (ODA) (i.e. grants and concessional loans, but also debt relief and *free technical assistance*) and, on the other hand, Chinese public lending, which is not classified as ODA but as *Other Official Flows* (OOF).Since the AidData data set reports most extensively on the concessionality of lending, this information was used for all countries examined.

Appendix 2: Chinese lending to individual countries from 2000 to 2017 (*to 2016, **to 2014) by region

Land/Region	Debt situation (according to Kaiser (2019))	Volume of Chinese disbursements in million US$	Share of Chinese loans in total public and private borrowing	Country-specific restrictions and comments (see below)
Sub-Saharan Africa				
Angola	slightly critical	42,845	52%	
Benin	slightly critical	996	30%	
Botswana	not critical	931	44%	
Burkina Faso	slightly critical	0	0%	
Burundi	slightly critical	99	11%	1
Cameroon	slightly critical	5,568	49%	1
Cape Verde	very critical	149	N/A	
Central African Republic	slightly critical	104	19%	1
Chad	slightly critical	641	15%	
Comoros	slightly critical	39	33%	1
Congo, Democratic Republic	slightly critical	3,435	74%	1
Congo, Republic of the	critical	7,424	163%	4
Djibouti	critical	1,467	73%	3
Equatorial Guinea	slightly critical	1,622	N/A	
Eritrea	critical	504	58%	
Ethiopia	critical	13,739	44%	3
Gabon	slightly critical	1,035	12%	
Gambia	very critical	0	0%	
Ghana	critical	3,498	14%	
Guinea	slightly critical	646	36%	
Guinea-Bissau	slightly critical	0	0%	
Ivory Coast	slightly critical	2,693	15%	1
Kenya	slightly critical	9,803	39%	
Lesotho	not critical	56	6%	
Liberia	slightly critical	50	3%	1
Madagascar	slightly critical	435	10%	1
Malawi	slightly critical	262	10%	1
Mali	slightly critical	981	19%	
Mauritania	critical	431	9%	
Mauritius	critical	492	1%	1
Mozambique	critical	2,289	19%	
Namibia	slightly critical	729	N/A	
Niger	slightly critical	703	17%	
Nigeria	slightly critical	4,831	9%	1
Rwanda	slightly critical	289	9%	
Sao Tome & Principe	critical	0	0%	
Senegal	slightly critical	1,630	14%	1

Seychelles	slightly critical	34	N/A	
Sierra Leone	critical	224	12%	1
South Africa	slightly critical	3,784	3%	1
South Sudan	slightly critical	182	N/A	
Sudan	critical	6,492	73%	
Swaziland	not critical	0	0%	
Tanzania	slightly critical	2,348	13%	1
Togo	slightly critical	693	44%	1
Uganda	slightly critical	2,968	23%	1
Zambia	critical	6,377	34%	1.3
Zimbabwe	critical	2,214	22%	1
North Africa & Middle East				
Algeria	not critical	9	0%	
Bahrain	very critical	0	0%	
Egypt	critical	3,422	4%	
Iran	not critical	3,643	21%	2
Iraq**	slightly critical	0	0%	
Jordan	critical	1,622	6%	2
Kuwait	not critical	0	0%	
Lebanon**	very critical	0	0%	
Morocco	slightly critical	1,031	1%	
Oman**	not critical	0	0%	
Qatar	not critical	0	0%	
Saudi Arabia**	not critical	0	0%	
Tunisia	critical	145	0%	
United Arab Emirates**	not critical	30	N/A	
Yemen	critical	83	2%	
Europe & CIS				
Albania**	critical	126	2%	
Armenian**	critical	0	0%	
Azerbaijan	slightly critical	0	0%	
Belarus**	slightly critical	4,088	11%	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	slightly critical	1,269	7%	2
Georgia**	critical	0	0%	
Kazakhstan**	critical	6,863	2%	
Kosovo **	not critical	0	0%	
Kyrgyzstan**	critical	2,331	32%	
Macedonia**	slightly critical	667	7%	
Moldova **	slightly critical	0	0%	
Montenegro**	slightly critical	1,006	33%	
Russia	not critical	42,717	5%	2
Serbia	critical	514	1%	2

Tajikistan	critical	1,210	15%	2
Turkey**	critical	920	0%	
Turkmenistan**	slightly critical	8,412	610%	4
Ukraine**	critical	8,227	3%	
Uzbekistan	not critical	5,073	21%	2
Latin America & Caribbean				
Antigua and Barbuda **	critical	45	N/A	
Argentina**	slightly critical	15,849	12%	
Aruba	not critical	0	0%	
Bahamas	slightly critical	2,549	N/A	
Barbados	critical	170	N/A	
Belize	critical	0	0%	
Bolivia	not critical	2,462	13%	
Brazil	critical	29,017	2%	
Colombia	critical	79	0%	
Costa Rica	slightly critical	395	1%	
Dominica **	slightly critical	47	13%	
Dominican Republic	slightly critical	0	0%	
Ecuador	slightly critical	17,399	25%	
El Salvador	critical	0	0%	
Grenada	slightly critical	0	0%	
Guatemala	slightly critical	0	0%	
Guyana	slightly critical	175	7%	
Haiti	slightly critical	0	0%	
Honduras	slightly critical	0	0%	
Jamaica	very critical	2,134	8%	
Mexico	slightly critical	1,000	0%	
Nicaragua**	critical	4	0%	
Panama	critical	0	0%	
Paraguay	slightly critical	0	0%	
Peru	slightly critical	102	0%	
Saint Vincent and The Grenadines	slightly critical	0	0%	
St Kitts and Nevis	critical	0	0%	
St. Lucia	slightly critical	0	0%	
Surinam **	slightly critical	238	N/A	
Trinidad & Tobago	not critical	2,578	N/A	
Uruguay**	slightly critical	0	0%	
Venezuela	critical	65,671	100%	4
Asia & Oceania				
Afghanistan**	slightly critical	0	0%	
Bangladesh	slightly critical	6,716	18%	2
Bhutan **	very critical	0	0%	

Brunei Darussalam *	not critical	204	N/A	
Cambodia*	slightly critical	6,765	58%	
Fiji *	not critical	843	71%	
India*	slightly critical	7,705	1%	
Indonesia	critical	8,811	1%	2
Kiribati **	slightly critical	0	0%	
Laos	critical	12,212	80%	2
Malaysia	slightly critical	13,140	N/A	2
Maldives**	slightly critical	226	16%	3
Marshall Islands **	slightly critical	0	0%	
Micronesia **	slightly critical	2	N/A	
Mongolia	very critical	355	1%	
Myanmar	not critical	3,112	26%	
Nauru *	slightly critical	0	0%	
Nepal**	slightly critical	433	18%	
Pakistan	critical	24,874	27%	2
Palau **	not critical	0	0%	
Papua New Guinea	critical	429	2%	
Philippines *	slightly critical	828	1%	
Samoa*	slightly critical	169	41%	
Solomon Islands **	slightly critical	0	0%	
Sri Lanka**	critical	8,502	21%	
Thailand*	not critical	0	0%	
Timor-Leste *	not critical	0	0%	
Tonga *	slightly critical	173	103%	4
Tuvalu **	slightly critical	0	0%	
Vanuatu *	slightly critical	223	96%	
Vietnam	slightly critical	10,994	10%	2

Country-specific restrictions and comments:

1 = During the investigation period, over 10 percent of the total disbursements went to the private sector from all foreign creditors, for which there is no information regarding Chinese lending. Therefore, it must be assumed that the share of Chinese disbursements in total disbursements during the investigation period is underestimated.

2 = Since only disbursements for the energy sector are known from 2014 to 2017, it must be assumed that lending for this period is underestimated.

3 = Current negotiations regarding the restructuring of receivables.

4 = The values above 100 percent in the column "Share of Chinese loans in total public and private borrowing" for Turkmenistan, the Republic of the Congo, Tonga and Venezuela can be attributed to two reasons: (1) the discrepancy between the "commitments" presented here with the actual disbursements; (2) gaps in reporting on lending or borrowing from/to the World Bank.

Appendix 3: Chinese Debt Cancellations 2000-2017

Country	Year	Perimeter	Result
Afghanistan	2002	N/A	cancellation [1]
Afghanistan	2004	18,000,000	cancellation [1]
Angola	2007	6,572,433	cancellation [1]
Angola	2015	21,300,000,000	restructuring [2]
Angola	2018	N/A	ongoing negotiations[2]
Bangladesh	2009	7,319,127	restructuring [1]
Bangladesh	2009	N/A	cancellation [1]
Bangladesh	2011	92,858,251	cancellation [1]
Benin	2006	N/A	Cancellation[1]
Botswana	2018	7,200,000	cancellation [2]
Burundi	2001	45,722,577	cancellation [1]
Burundi	2007	27,998,566	Cancellation[1]
Burundi	2007	18,070,248	Cancellation[1]
Cambodia	2002	200,000,000	cancellation [1]
Cambodia	2010	200,000,000	cancellation [1]
Cambodia	2016	90,000,000	cancellation [2, 3]
Cameroon	2001	34,000,000	cancellation [2]
Cameroon	2002	5,738,978	restructuring [1]
Cameroon	2007	N/A	cancellation [1]
Cameroon	2007	32,000,000	cancellation [2]
Cameroon	2010	30,000,000	cancellation [1,2]
Cameroon	2019	78,000,000	cancellation [2]
Cape Verde	2007	N/A	cancellation [1]
Central African Rep.	2007	11,475,863	cancellation [1]
Chad	2007	33,384,329	cancellation [1]
Congo, Republic of the	2001	75,000,000	cancellation [1]
Congo, Republic of the	2019	N/A	ongoing negotiations[2]
Cuba	2008	7,200,000	restructuring [1,2]
Cuba	2011	6,000,000,000	cancellation [1,2]
Djibouti	2019	800,000,000	ongoing negotiations[2]
Ecuador	2017-2018	1,000,000,000	restructuring [2]
Equatorial Guinea	2001	N/A	cancellation [1]
Equatorial Guinea	2005	N/A	cancellation [1]
Equatorial Guinea	2007	75,000,000	cancellation [1]
Eritrea	2001	3,000,000	cancellation [1]
Ethiopia	2001	122,560,000	cancellation [1]
Ethiopia	2007	18,500,000	cancellation [1]
Ethiopia	2018	3,300,000,000	restructuring [2]
Ethiopia	2019	N/A	ongoing negotiations[2]
Ghana	2002	53,500,000	cancellation [1, 2]
Ghana	2003	66,000,000	cancellation [1]
Ghana	2007	126,000,000	cancellation[1, 2]

Ghana	2014-2015	1,500,000,000	restructuring/cessation of further loans [2]
Guinea	2005	45,000,000	cancellation [1]
Guinea	2007	4,000,000	cancellation [1]
Guinea-Bissau	2001	5,800,000	cancellation [1]
Guyana	2003	20,000,000	cancellation [1]
Iraq	2010	6,800,000	cancellation [1]
Ivory Coast	2007	24,636,020	Cancellation[1]
Ivory Coast	2011	N/A	Cancellation[1]
Kazakhstan	2018	N/A	restructuring [2]
Kenya	2001	13,625,177	cancellation [1]
Kyrgyzstan	2003	239,216	restructuring [1]
Kyrgyzstan	2008	7,000,000	cancellation [1]
Laos	2006	45,000,000	cancellation [1]
Lesotho	2001	4,646,203	cancellation [1]
Lesotho	2018	10,600,000	cancellation [2]
Liberia	2007	1,000,000	cancellation [1]
Liberia	2007	10,515,893	cancellation[1]
Madagascar	2001	30,000,000	cancellation[1]
Maldives	2019	N/A	ongoing negotiations[2]
Mali	2001	50,474,838	cancellation [1]
Mauritania	2007	61,000,000	cancellation[1]
Mongolia	2002	902,755	restructuring [1]
Mongolia	2017	2,200,000,000	restructuring [4]
Mozambique	2001	22,000,000	cancellation [1]
Mozambique	2005	7,500,000	restructuring [1]
Mozambique	2005	294,000,000	cancellation [1]
Mozambique	2007	30,000,000	cancellation [1]
Mozambique	2017	34,000,000	cancellation [2]
Mozambique	2018	N/A	restructuring [2]
Myanmar	2002	72,000,000	cancellation [1]
Myanmar	2006	30,099,938	cancellation [1]
Nauru	2002	77,000,000	cancellation [1]
Niger	2001	12,000,000	cancellation [1]
Nigeria	2003	2,151,045	cancellation [1]
Rwanda	2001	2,700,000	cancellation [1]
Rwanda	2001	13,673,924	cancellation [1]
Rwanda	2007	160,000,000	cancellation [1]
Samoa	2006	11,500,000	cancellation [1]
Senegal	2006	18,500,000	cancellation [1]
Seychelles	2011	44,207,982	restructuring [1]
Sierra Leone	2007	22,000,000	cancellation [1]
Somalia	2005	3,000,500	cancellation [1]
Sri Lanka	2012	307,000,000	restructuring [2]
Sri Lanka	2016-18	(min.)1,100,000,000	Seizure of assets [2]
Sri Lanka	2019	1,000,000,000	restructuring [2]

Sudan	2001	40,131,000	cancellation [1]
Sudan	2007	70,000,000	cancellation [1]
Sudan	2007	1,400,000	cancellation [1]
Sudan	2010	5,908,185	cancellation [1]
Sudan	2012	N/A	restructuring [1]
Sudan	2014	N/A	restructuring [1]
Sudan	2017	160,000,000	cancellation [2]
Tajikistan	2011	N/A	Possibly seizure of assets [2]
Tanzania	2001	19,200,000	cancellation [1]
Tanzania	2001	18,600,000	cancellation [1]
Tanzania	2007	N/A	cancellation [1]
Togo	2006	18,687,045	cancellation [1]
Togo	2012	16,061,830	cancellation [1]
Tonga	2018	N/A	restructuring [2]
Uganda	2001	50,000,000	cancellation [1]
Uganda	2007	17,000,000	cancellation [1]
Ukraine	2014	52,000,000	restructuring [1]
Ukraine	2014	3,000,000,000	restructuring [2]
Vanuatu	2000	5,000,000	cancellation [1]
Vanuatu	2003	N/A	restructuring [1]
Vanuatu	2016-2017	5,000,000	cancellation [2]
Venezuela	2014	N/A	restructuring [1]
Venezuela	2015	N/A	restructuring [2]
Venezuela	2016	N/A	restructuring [2]
Venezuela	2018	N/A	restructuring [2]
Yemen	2002	84,000,000	cancellation [1]
Zambia	2001	40,000,000	cancellation [1]
Zambia	2006	211,000,000	cancellation [1]
Zambia	2007	8,000,000	cancellation [1]
Zambia	2017	N/A	ongoing negotiations[2]
Zimbabwe	2003	42,000,000	restructuring [1]
Zimbabwe	2003	17,900,000	restructuring [1]
Zimbabwe	2010	54,684,000	restructuring [1]
Zimbabwe	2015	40,000,000	cancellation [2]
Zimbabwe	2018	N/A	Restructuring/ cessation of further lending [2]
Total		**45,166,245,923**	
of which cancellations		9,419,553,865	

Sources:

[1] AidData (2017): "Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset, Version 1.0", retrieved from http://aiddata.org/data/chinese-global-official-finance-dataset.

[2] Feng, A .; A. Kratz and L. Wright (2019): "New Data on the 'Debt Trap' Question", Rhodium Group, April 29, 2019.

[3] Custer, S .; B. Russell; M. DiLorenzo; M. Cheng; S. Ghose; J. Sims; J. Turner and H. Desai (2018): "Ties That Bind: Quantifying China's public diplomacy and its 'good neighbour' effect". AidData at William & Mary.

[4] Reuters (2017): "IMF approves $ 5.5 billion bailout package for Mongolia", May 25, 2017.